The management of maritime claims is becoming an important issue in the study of interstate conflict. Since World War II, most contested maritime claims have been associated with low-level conflict (mainly shows of force, or what we call maritime provocations) and have not resulted in fatalities. However, what is puzzling is that many competing claims are also associated with states that are alliance partners. To explain this puzzle, we trace the management of maritime claims to states' participation in different types of security institutions. We argue that joint membership in highly institutionalized security organizations, namely defensive alliances, provides aggrieved challenger states with the opportunity to undermine the position of defending states by using low-level maritime provocations. The alliance has an incentive to provide an institutional security umbrella to maintain its organization's strength and continuity. High levels of commitment to defensive alliances provide a challenger state with the opportunity to behave provocatively without risking an escalation of the conflict or severely damaging its reputation within the alliance. We test our theory using data on all maritime claims and their associated militarization attempts in the Western Hemisphere and Europe from 1900 to 2001 from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project.
Introduction
News of international maritime disputes-such as those between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea, Britain and Spain over Gibraltar, Japan and Russia over the southern Kuril Islands, and between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors in the South China Sea-demonstrate that the management of maritime claims is becoming an important issue in the study of interstate conflict. Disputed maritime claims occur when explicit contention is made by official government representatives between two or more nation-states over the use of a specific maritime zone (Hensel et.al 2008) . Worldwide, the rise in the number of maritime disputes has increased sharply over the past century. For instance, there have been a total of 143 dyadic claims for the Western Hemisphere (68) and Europe (75) from 1900 to 2001 (Hensel et al. 2008) . From 1900 to 1945, there were only twenty-nine dyadic claims between states, but that number rose to 104 during the Cold War from 1946 to 1989, and seventy-nine claims in the immediate post-Cold War decade alone, from 1990 to 2001. 1 In this paper, we argue that the ways states manage these conflicts is distinct from other contentious issues. Specifically, we contend that challenger states manage their maritime claims through multiple lower-level violations. Instead of primarily managing their claims through the use of force (for example, by seizing and occupying territory, firing missiles, or with naval clashes), states increasingly prefer to engage in low-level violations, such as sending their merchant marine, patrol boats, or coast guard ships into disputed waters. These violations are the threat or display of force, or what we call maritime provocations: actions that rarely result in any fatalities.
Maritime provocations are becoming an increasingly common phenomenon. For example, Greece announced that Turkey violated Greek territorial waters 299 times in 2015 and 414 times in 2016. Spain was accused of violating the UK's territorial waters in Gibraltar 420 times in 2016 (Chorley 2014) . Furthermore, the curious thing about the Turkey-Greece and the UK-Spain maritime conflicts is that they are all between member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the world's strongest institutionalized security body. Scholars widely view alliances as institutions designed for deterring aggression in order to prevent the onset of conflict with a third party (Leeds et al. 2002) , not for facilitating it among their own member states (Kenwick, Vasquez, and Powers 2015; Leeds and Johnson 2017) . In addition, most claims occur between highly-developed and democratic states (Daniels and Mitchell 2017; Mitchell and Prins 1999) . Rather than resorting to direct attacks over a disputed area and surrounding waters, these provocations on the seas lead us to our research question: under what conditions do states engage in maritime provocations?
In this article, we investigate the variation in the management of maritime claims by advancing an institutional theory involving states' use of their alliances. In brief, we argue that joint membership in highly institutionalized security organizations, specifically defensive alliances, 2 provides aggrieved 1 These numbers are obtained by counting the number of claim dyads (claimdy) that fall into the time periods taken from the the ICOWdyadyr.dta dataset, version 1.1. The average number of claims per year increases in each period from 0.63 from 1900 -1945 , to 2.36 from 1946 -1989 , to 6.58 from 1990 -2001 claims in the Western Hemisphere. In the post-2001 period, states that ratified the UNCLOS agreement were less likely to have maritime claims (Daniels and Mitchell 2017) . 2 Defensive aid is just one of many provisions or obligations that an alliance can have. Leeds et al. (2002, 238) define alliances as "written agreements, signed by official representatives of at least two independent states, that include promises to aid a partner in the event of military conflict, to remain neutral in the event of conflict, to refrain from military conflict with one another, or to consult/cooperate in the event of international crises that create a potential for military conflict." In this article, we use the concepts of alliance, obligation, and provision interchangeably.
challenger states with the opportunity to provoke defending states with low-level conflict. Concern over escalation from provocations is prevented through the incentive structure provided by alliances, the goal of which is to maintain internal cohesion in the possible event of an external threat. Of the several forms of alliances, we argue that a defensive alliance provides challenger states with an institutional security umbrella to engage in maritime provocations against a defending state. Defensive aid, as distinct from offensive, consultative, nonaggression, or neutrality forms of aid (Leeds et al. 2002) , is the highest level of obligation of any type of security arrangement. Defensive alliances demand the highest levels of commitment and shared strategic interests among their members, which results in a lower fear of member abandonment. Membership in a defensive alliance signals to fellow member states that there is a low risk that conflict between them will escalate.
While an alliance provides a security umbrella and can prevent escalation, if low-level conflicts did not offer benefits to a challenger state, then they would not rationally provoke their adversary in the first place. We contribute to the literature by describing how joint membership in security institutions can actually facilitate these low-level provocations, which in our analysis we proxy with the presence of a militarized interstate dispute. We argue that customary international law can give the challenger state a benefit: gradual control over the claimed area. First, if a defending state does not police such low-level violations over time, the object of dispute can turn into a legal claim for the challenger under customary international law. Under international law, acquiescence on the part of the defender state is interpreted as tacit acceptance of the challenge made by the constant provocations over time. If the defender does not protest, it can be viewed as tacit consent. This means that it is possible that, over time, the maritime claim will go from a contentious issue to one that is legally recognized as the challenger state's territory under customary international law. Second, even if the defender does protest, a sustained claim by the challenger still gradually strengthens the latter's legal grounds. Therefore, the cost-benefit calculations can favor the challenger's position in carving out new footholds.
First, we will review previous research on maritime claims and how the Law of the Sea affects state behavior. Second, we will present our argument regarding defensive alliances and the issues of intra-alliance politics, paying special attention to the concepts of dependence, commitment, and interests at stake, arguing that the latter two allow defensive alliances to serve as a security umbrella. 3 Third, we will detail the research design and results. Lastly, we conclude with implications for the study of maritime claims . 3 Our theory assumes that states are unitary actors with a common interest in satisfying sets of domestic constituencies. Thus, domestic political dynamics such as regime type, party politics, and leaders' perceptions are not part of our purview. Although the theory cannot predict the actions of all states in a precise manner, our theory looks at international patterns as a whole in order to highlight common factors at a systemic level.
Previous Research on Maritime Claims
For there to be a basis for a maritime claim, there must be explicit contention from official government representatives between two or more nation-states over the use of a specific maritime zone (Hensel et al. 2008) . From 1900 to 2001, the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project codes 267 maritime claims across all regions. The regions with the most claims were Europe (75) and the Western Hemisphere (67) (Hensel and Mitchell 2017) . Based on the ICOW typology of contentious issues, maritime claims are considered to have a high tangible salience and low intangible salience (Hensel et al. 2008) . This is due to the resources that are found beneath maritime zones that make up the tangible salience measures. But, unlike territorial claims that have conflictprone intangible salience measures such as homeland and identity ties, maritime claims do not elicit the same reactions. Migratory fish stocks and oil are important measures of maritime claim salience. How are maritime claims managed? First, maritime claims are more conflict-prone than riverine claims, but not nearly as much as land-based territorial ones. From 1900 to 2001, 27.3% of maritime claims were associated with militarized interstate disputes; this is in contrast to 41.8% of territorial claims and 11.2% of riverine claims (Hensel and Mitchell 2017) . Maritime claims are also less likely to escalate to war. The Falklands/Malvinas case is so far the only maritime claim to be associated with an interstate war. Because most maritime claims are seen as less intangibly salient than territorial ones, some scholars associate them with the less-contentious issues between democracies (Daniels and Mitchell 2017; Mitchell and Prins 1999) . Scholars find that territorial issues are the most fatal and conflict-prone, but once dyads settle their borders and eventually become democratic (Gibler 2012; Owsiak 2012) , the contentious issues that remain are likely to become less salient. Some scholars analyze the management of maritime claims between democratic dyads (Daniels and Mitchell 2017) . For instance, Mitchell and Prins (1999) find that in the post-World War II era, democratic states have contention over: 1) violations of land, sea, and air boundaries; 2) territory; and 3) commerce and navigation. Within these categories, there are lowerlevel disputes over fishing rights and other maritime issues. Furthermore, Daniels and Mitchell (2017) find that maritime claims are associated with economic opportunities for neighbor states when both are major powers, states with higher levels of energy production and symmetric energy production at the dyadic level, as well as the external security environment by the presence of dyadic conflict. Nemeth et al. (2014) explain the management of maritime issues through two mechanisms: 1) privatization of the sea through Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), and 2) institutionalization, through membership in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Either mechanism may lead to peaceful conflict-management strategies because they both clarify commitments and private information, involve salient issues, have flexibility, and imply reputational costs for reneging as described in Mitchell and Hensel (2007) . Nemeth et al. (2014) find that both mechanisms are associated with the peaceful management of maritime claims. Specifically, EEZ boundaries are associated with bilateral negotiations, while membership in UNCLOS is associated with third-party activities, both binding and non-binding. They also find that membership UNCLOS correlates negatively with the emergence of new claims. Now we turn to our own theory: first, we demonstrate the importance of international law in structuring state preferences; then, we argue that defensive alliances provide an institutional safety net for provocations to occur.
How Customary International Law Encourages Provocations
In this section, we argue that international law is important for explaining states' motivations for engaging in maritime provocations. Two major sources of international law are treaty law and customary law. Treaty law is explicit and legally binding. In contrast, customary law is implicit and refers to the idea that accumulated practices can bind states' behavior. Our argument pertains to customary law. Although what constitutes such practices or how much time is required for these practices to become recognized under customary law is often a matter of contention, recent cases can provide some insight. For example, in the North Sea Continental Shelf case (1969), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated that even though practices existed for a short period of time, the short timeframe did not hamper the formation of a new customary international law (Tanaka 2012, 11) . Most jurists also generally accept that duration has an inverse relationship to consistency in order to be binding-the shorter the duration of a practice, the more consistent it must have to have been throughout that short amount of time (Charlesworth 1991) . However, exactly what constitutes "state practice" in the creation of customary law is an open question. Broadly, state practice includes "omissions, diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press releases, official manuals on legal questions, the opinions of official legal advisers, comments by governments on drafts produced by the International Law Commission, state legislation and national judicial decisions, etc." (Tanaka 2012, 10) In a maritime dispute, acquiescence by a defending state in the face of provocations, meaning choosing not to formally complain or defend a boundary, can be cited as a legal basis of support for the challenger's claim. For instance, Shaw (2017, 66) writes: "where a state or states take action which they declare to be legal, the silence of other states can be used as an expression of opinio juris or concurrence in the new legal rule." Echoing this view, Walden (1977) argues that tacit consent theory, in all its forms, has the great merit of recognizing the constitutive nature of custom. The 1962 ICJ case over the Temple of Preah Vihear on the border of Cambodia and Thailand illustrative: it shows how acquiescence can, over time, have a legal effect. On June 15, 1962, the ICJ, ruling in favor of Cambodia, concluded that Thailand was under obligation to withdraw any military or police forces from the temple area: "Since there was no reaction on the part of the Siamese authorities, either then or for many years, they must be held to have acquiesced" (ICJ 1962) . Concerning Thailand's argument that Cambodia acquiesced to Thailand's claim of ownership due to its Thailand's administrative occupation, the ICJ ruled that, Thailand "had indeed instanced the acts of her administrative authorities on the ground as evidence that she had never accepted the Annex I line at Preah Vihear. But the Court found it difficult to regard such local acts as negating the consistent attitude of the central authorities" (ICJ 1962) .
The fisheries case between Norway and the UK also reveals the importance of continuing practice. The UK asked the ICJ to consider whether Norway's unique method of its delimitation of territorial sea/fisheries zone violated international law. In 1951, the ICJ ruled that Norway's delimitation was legal because the UK for many years quietly acquiesced without protest to Norway's delimitation (ICJ 1951) . Another example is Malaysia and Singapore's disputes over small features between both states: Pedra Branca, Middle Rocks, and South Ledge. While these features are located closer to Malaysia than to Singapore, the ICJ concluded in 2008 that Pedra Branca belonged to Malaysia until 1980, but that thereafter sovereignty over it had passed to Singapore [para. 276] (ICJ 2008, 96) . In its opinion, the ICJ concluded that Malaysia never protested any of Singapore's various acts that could be interpreted as its exercise of sovereignty [paras. [274] [275] (ICJ 2008, 95-96) .
These examples clearly indicate that various actions by a challenger state, which from the defending state's perspective might be undermining its sovereignty, could be interpreted as the challenger state's exercise of its own sovereignty, insofar as these actions could legally transfer sovereignty of one state's territory to another state. While these actions are not associated with outright military confrontation, it may only take small, continuous actions (like shipwreck investigations around disputed features and the display of ensigns on islands) in order to bolster a claim. Therefore, continued practice, over time, can be another form of establishing a legal claim. Put another way, as provocations continue over an extensive amount of time without protest by the target state, the target state might be eventually yielding its rights to the disputed area under customary international law. Provocations can yield benefits to challenger states at a low cost when they are viewed as the challenger state's simple exercise of its maritime rights. Even if the defender does protest against these violations, the challenger can claim that low-level provocations are an extension of its own sovereignty, gradually accumulating them in an ever-growing record of legal precedent. Therefore, the benefit of provocation gives the challenger reasons to engage such low-level violations.
Given the availability of such benefits to challenger states, the provisions of an alliance may provide greater opportunities for member states to engage in low-level provocations with little cost. In the next section, we argue that differences between various types of security institutions help to explain the variations observed in the management of maritime claims.
How Defensive Alliances Facilitate Provocations
Defensive alliances are institutional opportunity mechanisms that enable member states to engage in maritime provocations. 4 We trace the importance of defensive alliances to intra-alliance politics, with a focus on the concepts of members' commitments and strategic issues at stake. Defensive alliances entail the highest level of commitment and shared strategic interests, designed to lower member states' fear of abandonment. This provides a greater sense of invulnerability for states embarking on maritime provocations by providing them with minimum guarantees of intra-alliance restraint, thus ensuring that a conflict does not escalate and the alliance maintains its overall strength and continuity. States know that an escalation is costly, since it makes both states more vulnerable, either to opportunistic outside intervention by a common enemy or to diplomatic intervention within the alliance.
Since alliances are formal institutions that coordinate and signal states' intentions (Gibler 2009 ), joining one explicitly demonstrates a member's commitments regarding its future foreign policy behavior to the international community. This commitment is costly because when states commit to uphold the terms of an alliance, they voluntarily choose to constrain their sovereignty (Morrow 2000) . In so choosing, a state gives its commitment credibility. However, alliances differ in their provisions. Some, such as consultation and nonaggression pacts, require minimal sovereignty costs and little commitment. In contrast, by signing a defensive alliance, states legally commit to coming to the defense of their fellow member states in case of attack. Defensive alliances present the highest and strongest military commitment a state can make (Leeds et al. 2002) . We contend that the institutional strength of a state's commitment ultimately becomes more important when a contentious issue, such as an unresolved maritime claim, arises between two states in a defensive alliance. The strength of the commitment provides states with cover for their actions.
Intra-Alliance Politics
Now we turn to the topic of intra-alliance politics as we discuss further the issues of dependence, commitment, and interests at stake. Alliances are institutions that manage external threats by facilitating burden-and 4 In our analysis, we use the presence of a militarized interstate dispute (MID) as a proxy for maritime provocations.
information-sharing (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966) . Information sharing is associated with transparency by reducing conflicts among members when they are uncertain about others' power (Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros 2006) . When it comes to managing external threats, Schroeder (1976) argues that an alliance functions by restraining or controlling the actions of its members. The desire to exercise control over an ally's policy is one of the principal reasons for forming an alliance. Similarly, Weitsman (2004) states that some alliances come into force in order to resolve conflict among their signatories, and that states form alliances in order to avoid military hostilities between member states. Krebs (1999) also argues that the ability of alliances to function as institutions that promote peaceful relationships among their member states is not always guaranteed, but rather that the transparency generated by them can intensify conflicts among their members.
The claim that defensive alliance membership might facilitate low-level conflict between members is based on its high level of commitment and strategic issues at stake. Snyder (1997) argues that a state's negotiating power during an alliance's formation results from the concepts of alliance dependence, commitment, and the interests at stake. The management of alliances, or what Snyder calls the alliance security dilemma, is about dealing with the issues of abandonment and entrapment, and how the concepts of dependence, commitment, and interests of members states influence their behavior. If the fear of abandonment is low, states are less likely to worry about other members defecting from their commitments. When alliance partners have a high proportion of shared interests, such as when they confront the same enemy, there is also little fear of abandonment. Low fear of abandonment holds especially in cases when the commitment takes the form of strategic interests, such as in the face of major conflicts or, for example, between NATO alliance members during the Cold War. This is also the case when there is a high level of commitment between member states, as is the case with defensive alliances. While higher levels of commitment may result in lowered overall bargaining power, when it comes to strategic interests, the ability to credibly threaten to defect weakens, which results in a lower fear of abandonment (Snyder 1997) . Defensive alliances are the strongest institutionalized form of security agreement between states, so by definition, they involve the highest levels of commitment and shared strategic interests at stake, which protects against the fear of abandoning the alliance and escalating the conflict. Defensive alliances provide a security umbrella for a state to engage in low-level maritime provocations. The challenger will not worry about its alliance member abandoning the institution as a result, as the large cost involved in taking such action would far outweigh the relatively minor benefits.
In addition, by being in a security institution that has the highest level of commitment, as opposed to not being in one, it is much safer to resort to low-level provocation because both states know it is not the intention of the other state to escalate the conflict. The defending state is more likely to believe the challenger is not intending to escalate when both are in a defensive alliance, solving an informational problem. 5 Escalation is further prevented because member states have an incentive to maintain their organization's strength and continuity, as it is an instrument to deter common external threats (Walt 1987) . Defensive alliances primarily come into force to deter an external threat, and this mission remains the priority despite intra-alliance politics over less-salient issues, such as how to manage a maritime claim. To maintain this priority, there is an incentive to resolve or overlook any provocations over maritime claims to preserve their most important priority: continuity in the face of external threats. Low-level maritime provocations are not enough to break up alliances, given their lower salience and the higher-level commitments between members. In sum, our theory posits that defensive alliances can work disproportionately to the greater benefit of one party. Challenger states have an incentive to continuously provoke target states over their maritime claims, since customary international law favors actions that can be interpreted as the continuous exercise of sovereignty as forming a basis for a legal right to endow claims to such continued practices, and since membership in a defensive alliance might facilitate these low-level provocations. Based on these theoretical claims, we present two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The presence of an alliance will increase the probability of a militarized interstate dispute in a maritime claim.
Hypothesis 2: The presence of a defensive alliance will increase and have a higher substantive effect on the probability of a militarized interstate dispute in a maritime claim.
Research Design
To test our hypotheses, we use a dataset of all maritime claims in the Western Hemisphere and Europe from 1900 to 2001, drawing on data from the ICOW project (Hensel et al. 2008) . 6 Our unit of analysis is the 5 Maritime conflict is also less costly than land-based conflict. The vast majority of provocations are nonfatal, which diminishes the level of uncertainty surrounding the risks associated with them. 6 Hensel et al. (2008) ; Hensel and Mitchell (2017) report statistics for the number of maritime claims across all regional categories and their militarized management attempts; however, this full data is not currently available.
Other scholars have used similar samples (Hensel 2001; Nemeth et al. 2014) . Even though alliance is present for 2,123 out of 3,231 total dyad claim years (65.71%) and defensive alliance is present for 1,748 dyad claim years (54.1%), we believe that by conducting a rigorous analysis by running various robustness checks controlling for additional factors and using multiple models, we can minimize the impact of this limited sample. We hope to test our hypotheses on a global analysis once the data is available and update our findings, whatever the result. In addition, the assumption of our analysis treats the state as a unitary actor. We assume that every state has the same core interests regardless of domestic politics, but that the management of states' issues varies according to membership in different institutions. Membership in defensive alliances provides states with an opportune security umbrella under which to engage in low-level maritime provocations.
dyad claim year, as opposed to the dyad year. The reason for this design is that many dyads have multiple maritime claims in one year, and our analysis is about how security organizations relate to the unique management of individual claims within dyads, as opposed to how security organizations relate to dyads that have claims. Including all maritime claims is important because they vary widely in their salience. 7 There are 3,231 dyad claim years in the dataset. To identity the conflict management efforts of a dyad's maritime claims and connect our work with recent literature, we employ the same research design as Nemeth et al. (2014) .
Dependent Variable and Estimator
The dependent variable is the presence of militarized interstate dispute (MID) (Ghosen, Palmer, and Bremer 2004; Hensel et al. 2008 ). If defensive alliances provide an opportunity safety net, they will correlate positively with a higher likelihood of conflict. There are ninety MIDs in our dataset; this represents 2.79% of all dyad claim years. 8 Examples of MIDs include the mobilization of naval forces in the Caspian Sea dispute between Iran and Azerbaijan; the use of force over illegal fishing between Mexico and Guatemala; provocations and the use of force between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea dispute; and the use of force over Soviet fishing in Argentinean territorial waters. Interestingly, most militarized management attempts within maritime claims occur among alliance partners. Table 1 combines two crosstabs: on the left, for the presence of a MID and an alliance; on the right side, a MID and a defensive alliance. 9 It shows that 82.22% of MIDs take place among alliance members and 75.56% take place among defensive alliance members. 10 Since we do not have a variable that measures the number of incident-level provocations for the entire period, MIDs are used as a proxy. 11 (Hensel and Mitchell 2017) . 9 For the crosstab for MID and alliance, the Chi 2 (1) is 11.2061 with a p-value of 0.000; for the crosstab for MID and defensive alliance, the Chi 2 (1) is 17.1611 with a p-value of 0.00. 10 These crosstabs are for the presence of a MID, alliance, and defensive alliance in a dyad, state A and state B in year t. 11 Incident-level data is only available from 1993-2001 (see Palmer et al. 2015) .
permission. We primarily use probit regression models to test our hypotheses. Robustness checks using negative binomial and zero-inflated models do not change our results.
Independent Variable
To test the effect different security institutions have on the management of maritime claims, we use two different variables from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset (Leeds et al. 2002) , which collects data on alliance obligations. The first variable is "alliance" and the second is "defensive alliance"; both are binary measures. The alliance variable requires at least one obligation (defensive, offensive, neutrality, nonaggression, or consultation) to be coded as such. According to Leeds et al. (2002, 241) , "Obligations of defensive aid are promises to assist a partner actively in the event of attack on the partner's sovereignty or territorial integrity." States in a defensive alliance are legally obligated to come to the defense of their partner if attacked by a third party. Because of this commitment, defensive alliances are considered the strongest and most institutionalized kind of security arrangement. NATO, for example, is a defensive alliance. Our main theoretical expectation is that defensive alliances will have a stronger substantive effect on the probability of a MID.
Control Variables
We use a number of control variables that are common in the maritime literature. The first two are binary indicators: one for whether one state has an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and another indicating whether both states in a given dyad have their own EEZs. The next two are also binary indicators: one for whether one state is a member of UNCLOS, and another for whether both states are members of UNCLOS. These four variables are found in Nemeth et al. (2014) .
The next control concerns migratory fish stocks. Fish stocks are an important measure of tangible maritime salience. While this variable is a binary indicator, it contributes two points to the 12-measure salience index: one point for the challenger and one for the defender. Scholars find that disputes over fish stocks are the basis for many maritime claims (Mitchell and Prins1999) . The next variable is an indicator of "other salience," ranging from 0 to 10. Salience is a central feature of the issues surrounding conflict. Scholars find that the more salient an issue, the more likely it will lead to militarized management attempts. Included in this variable are homeland/dependent territory, strategic location, fishing zone, oil, and whether it is related to a territorial claim (Hensel 2001; Hensel et al. 2008 ). Both of these variables come from the ICOW dataset (Hensel et al. 2008 ). Next, we control for the capability imbalance (also called "relative power") between dyad members. The capability imbalance variable is the stronger Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score divided by the combined CINC and is taken from the ICOW dataset (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972, 19-48) . Lastly, we include another control, previous MIDs over the last ten years, weighted. The year before a MID is given the value of 1.0 and after that, it declines by 10% each year (Hensel et al. 2008; Nemeth et al. 2014) .
In further robustness checks (see appendix), we control for regime type, bilateral trade, coastline length, and total number of naval ships. The regime type variable is a binary measure of joint democracy, defined as +6 or higher on the Polity IV scale (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016) . Bilateral trade comes from the ICOW dataset (Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2009 ). Since our scope in this article focuses on the structural level, we avoid any theoretical discussion of domestic politics, and our empirical strategy does as well. We include these controls in the appendix to make sure domestic politics as well as interdependence are not influencing our primary contention: that the management of maritime claims results from the presence of different security institutions. Lastly, we include the natural log of each state's coastline length (Daxecker and Prins 2015) as well as their total number of naval ships (Crisher and Souva 2014) as potential counter-hypotheses of opportunity. When including these controls, the substantive results are the same. In each model, we use dyad fixed effects, which produce the same results, as well as temporal polynomials to control for time-dependence.
Results
Table 2 presents our main results. Table 3 presents the same results, only using negative binomial and a count variable, the number of MIDs, instead of a binary indicator. Table 4 is a robustness check controlling for regime type, bilateral trade, coastline length, and the total number of naval ships. Table 5 controls for other kinds of alliances. In sum, defensive alliance is positively associated with a higher likelihood of militarized conflict and is statistically significant.
In Table 2 , we test the presence of an alliance (Model 1) and defensive alliance (Model 2) on the likelihood of having a MID. Both variables are positive and statistically significant; however, defensive alliance has a much higher coefficient. The coefficient for alliance is 0.568 (0.246). The coefficient for defensive alliance is 1.235 (0.289). The same relationship occurs in Table 3 using a count-dependent variable. Both are positive and statistically significant, but defensive alliance has a much stronger effect. The first hypothesis is that the presence of an alliance will increase the probability of a MID in a maritime claim. In Tables 2 and 3, alliance is positive and significant, giving the first hypothesis support; however, in our robustness checks in Tables 4 and 6 , alliance is no longer significant.
The second hypothesis is that the presence of a defensive alliance will increase, and have a higher substantive effect on, the probability of a MID in a maritime claim. We find consistent support for this hypothesis in Tables 2  and 3 . Defensive alliances, because they represent the highest level of commitment and include strategic interests, give challenger states an institutionalized security umbrella under which to engage in higher numbers of low-level maritime provocations. Through their mutual commitment to a defensive alliance, a defending state knows the challenger is not willing to escalate the conflict militarily. We receive the same results when controlling for regime type, bilateral trade, coastline length, and the total number of naval ships in Table 4 ; as well as for other alliances, regardless of the combination, in Table 5 .
In additional robustness checks in Table 6 , we control for NATO by creating a binary control when both states are members of the alliance. 12 The NATO coefficient is consistently positive, ranging from 3.683 (0.275) to 3.904 (0.313) in our models, and statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level. Most importantly, its inclusion does not change our main finding that the presence of a defensive alliance is a positive predictor of low-level conflict over maritime claims. Table 6 also controls for the presence of the Greece-Turkey dyad. The inclusion of NATO and the Greece-Turkey dyad associates with alliance no longer being significant; however, defensive alliance is still positive and statistically significant. The Greece-Turkey dyad, through the Aegean Sea dispute, is one of the most conflict-prone maritime disputes. In addition to instances of fatal conflict over the issue, Turkey has also been accused by Greece of violating its territorial waters numerous times (Chorley 2014) . Figure 1 shows the substantive effects of Models 1 and 2 in Table 2 . The presence of an alliance and defensive alliance are positively associated with a MID in comparison to dyad claim years when there is not an alliance or defensive alliance. Most importantly, defensive alliances have a stronger substantive positive effect on conflict than does alliance alone. 13 Lastly, it is also important to assess rival explanations. We find consistent evidence that the presence of migratory fish stocks and dyadic membership in NATO associates with a militarized interstate dispute. While NATO is positive and significant, defensive alliance is a stronger predictor of maritime conflict, showing that it is the institution as opposed to a specific alliance that matters. We also find support that the total number of naval ships used by the challenger state positively associates with a dispute. Naval power might represent a form of opportunity for the challenger to engage in conflict. Similarly, Daniels and Mitchell (2017) argue that economic opportunity is one reason (in addition to external security factors) why maritime claims occur. We believe naval power's association with maritime conflict is a preliminary finding that needs more study.
Migratory fish stocks are considered one of the most salient aspects of maritime conflicts. Mitchell and Prins (1999) find that many maritime disputes between democracies are based on issues related to fishing, and Nemeth et al. (2014) find that migratory fish stocks positively associate with MIDs as well as bilateral negotiations and third-party activities; salience is a strong predictor of 13 We also simulate the predicted probabilities using the statistical software program known as Clarify (King, Wittenberg, and Tomz 2003) for Models 1 and 2 in Table 2 , leaving all independent variables at their means, and changing alliance and defensive alliance from 0 to 1 for when the dependent variable is 1. The predicted probability for alliance changed from 0.014 to 0.023. The predicted probability for defensive alliance changed from 0.013 to 0.026. More importantly, the percent chance in predicted probability for defensive alliance (101.34%) is almost twice as high as it is with alliance (56.55%). We receive the same substantive results when some independent variables are set at their minimum instead of the mean. Clarify dropped the dyad fixed effects so the models were simulated without them. a claim's management. Similar to Nemeth et al. (2014) , we do not find evidence that the presence of one or two EEZs as well as membership in UNCLOS associates with conflict. It appears that privatization through EEZs and institutionalization with membership in UNLOCS associate only with peaceful management attempts (see also Owsiak and Mitchell 2019) .
Conclusion
In this article, we investigated the variation in the management of maritime claims. Previous studies have looked to the non-contentious issues of democratic dyads, their relationship to the Law of the Sea in UNCLOS and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). In contrast, we put forth an institutional theory wherein the management of maritime claims results-counterintuitively-from shared membership in different kinds of security institutions. Instead of looking at institutions as a whole as providing collective security to their members, this paper hopes to shed light on a gap in the literature on alliance politics in this relatively unexamined area of maritime disputes.
In brief, we argue that membership in highly institutionalized security institutions (namely, defensive alliances) is actually associated with increased maritime provocations between member states because the alliance serves as a mutual security umbrella for them. Defensive alliances have high levels of commitment and strategic interests at stake, which allows states to engage in low-level maritime provocations. In addition, because such provocations represent only low levels of militarized conflict, they do not rise to the point of escalation, thereby allowing the alliance to maintain its strength and continuity. Outside of a defensive alliance, a defending state is less certain about the intentions of a challenger state, and whether its actions might be designed to escalate the conflict. Inside an alliance, however, challenger states are inherently signaling that they are not willing to escalate: therein lies the conundrum we seek to uncover.
